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Michael Thompson 
To understand t h e  failure of lugh-rise housing in Britain we need to 
look at its polar opposite - tk;e success of low-rise housing in Venezuela. 
Developing countries tend to look to developed countries for advice and 
the developed countries, for their part, are usually only too happy to 
oblige. So natural does this unequal relationship between metropolis and 
periphery appear that the possibility that expertise might also flow in the 
reverse direction - from deferential pupil to paternalistic teacher -- is 
not even considered. More is the pity. 
When it comes to housing and urban planning, Venezuela has tradi- 
tionally looked to Britain as its mentor and its first cadre in this field, in 
the years just after the Second World War,learnt their trade in the 
labyrinthme offices of the London County Council (the L.C.C.). In 
Venezuela's rapid oil-fuelled economic expansion during the Fifties and 
Sixties the capital, Caracas, blossomed with underpasses, roundabouts 
and high-rise housing in a tropical profusion such as would have glad- 
dened the temperate heart of any official in County Hall (the headquar- 
ters of the LCC). But, even then, they could not solve all their "prob- 
lems". Despite its scale, Caracas' housing programme was no match for 
the massive influx of poor migrants from the surrounding countryside. 
Illegal squatter settlements - horrendous teeming shanty towns - 
sprang up on steep city centre hillsides and on land further out that had 
been earmarked for other purposes. Many of these settlements, though 
illegal, are still there and, in ten years or less, the original shacks have 
been extended and rebuilt many times over until now the wooden poles 
and flattened-out oil-drums have given way to neat and comfortable 
three-storeyed brick houses. The local authorities, faced with a fait 
L 
accompli have gived up trying to evict the squatters and now wrestle with 
a different problem -- how to lay services along the higgledy-piggledy 
alleyways of these up-and-coming districts. But the next generation of 
squatters have managed to solve that problem as well. Knowing that 
sooner or later they will be in a position to negotiate paved roads and 
main services in exchange for votes, and having learnt that bureaucracies 
tend to think in straight lines, they now begin by laying out their squalid 
settlements on a rigid grid pattern that will ultimately ensure the highest 
possible number of votes per metre of sewerage pipe. 
Meanwhile, back in the hgh-rise housing that was built at great pub- 
lic expense, thngs have been getting worse and worse. It is not easy to 
keep pigs and hens in a sixteenth floor apartment especially when the 
lifts no longer operate and, with such odds against them, the inhabitants, 
the livestock and the buildings themselves have all suffered. As an 
exercise in the transfer of expertise it could scarcely be bettered; the 
rate of decline of the Venezuelan high-rise housing has matched, and in 
some cases has even exceeded, that achieved in Britain. 
But what is the lesson that can, and should, flow in the reverse direc- 
tion -- from Venezuela to Britain? Is it the anti-planners' message that 
any planning is always bound to be worse than no planning a t  all? Is it the 
Lairsez faire doctrine that, if you leave people to their own devices, the 
free operation of the market will do more to help them than anythmg 
el=? Is it that the advanced industrialized nations should abandon all 
public housing provision and dismantle the whole structure of the welfare 
state so that the poor and the homeless will eventually be forced to build 
driftwood shanty towns on the Essex marshes? Is it that the visitation 
(upon a small proportion of the population) of epidemics unknown since 
the Middle Ages, and of an infant mortality rate not matched even in the 
darkest and most satanic mills of the Industrial Revolution, is something , 
to be actively encouraged? 
No, the lesson has to do, not with the levels of misery and comfort a t  
which people live, but with the direction of change of those levels. If we 
only take the trouble to look we will see that in Venezuela there are two 
very different kinds of slums - the high-rise blocks that start off good and 
gel worse and worse, and the low-rise squatter settlements that start off 
hideously bad and get better and better. But this is not to say that aU 
hqh-rise housing gets worse and worse or that d l  shanty-towns get better 
and better; there are successes and failures on both sides. The lesson is 
simply that slums can come in two forms, dozvnwa7d s l u m  and upward 
slums. With downward slurns the problems get worse and worse; with 
upward slums the problems, though appalling to start with, eventually 
just go away. 
The anti-planners are often right when they point out that many 
planning solutions (such as lugh-rise public housing) create downward 
slums and, in consequence, are just a way of spending a great deal of 
money to make things worse than they were before, but this blanket 
rejection of planning would only be valid if that was all that planning could 
ever do. If planners could encourge upward slums to rise more quickly 
and, better still, if they could help to transform some downward slums 
into upward slums, that would be somethmg else altogether. The anti- 
planners may be right but, at present, their case is not proven. If 
Venezuela can help us to resolve this question then it will have done a 
p e a t  deal more for the metropolis than the metropolis ever did for it, 
ebpecially if it turns out that the anti-planners are wrong. 
There is, of course, no shortage of radical solutions based on the 
literal transplantation of upward slum techniques into the urban and 
social fabric of Britain. Self-build is now actively canvassed by a genera- 
tion of architectural students that has rejected the ideology of the 
Modern Movement lock, stock and barrel; anarchic architectural histori- 
ans point to the lessons we could learn from the permissive planning 
regulations that enabled thousands of working-class East-Enders to build 
a better life for themselves, stage by gradual stage, in the Essex country- 
side; the Ruff Tuff Cream Puff Estate Agency (a squatter's information 
service operating under the slogan "open up the tin and let the people 
in") has shown many a professional malcontent, and many the scion of a 
bourgeois suburban dynasty, how to help themselves to the under-utilized 
housing stock of the inner city. All these solutions have something to con- 
tribute but their contributions are essentially those of the gadfly -- they 
sting, irritate and provoke the somnolent bureaucratic beast but they do 
not tell it which way it should charge. Before we can tell it that we will 
have to learn our Venezuelan lesson. 
Since our industrial revolution and its accompanying migration from 
the countryside to the towns happened a long time ago, it might seem 
that the Venezuelan experience has little relevance for us; it might seem 
that we do not have any upward slums. Certainly, few if any shanty towns 
are to be found springing up in St. James's Park or along the verges of the 
MI, but it is to parallels between social processes rather than to the phy- 
sical manifestations of those processes that we should be looking. 
It was in those parts which, to his dismay, the Venezuelan planner 
found he could not reach that the upward slums -- the shanty towns - 
materialized. the steep hillsides of the city centre and the "green field 
sites" at  its margins were all hatched in in various coloured inks on the 
planner's maps and the squatters, when they moved onto those sites, 
were "nonconforming users" to a man. It is just that the planner's ambi- 
tion had o'erleapt itself and that, to his acute embarrassment, the felt-tip 
pen had proved nowhere near as mighty as the self-help sword. So, rather 
than looking in vain for tell-tale traces of British shanty towns, we should 
see if we can find areas of Britain to whch the planners have laid claim 
but which they have been unable to control. Where in Britain have the 
nonconforming users been able to continue in their nonconformity? The 
answer, perhaps surprisingly, is "the inner city". 
The trendy hinterland of Regent's Park, the St. John's Wood streets 
(so handy for the American School and the new mosque!), the canalside 
Regency villas of Little Venice, the Georgian terraces and garden squares 
of Islington ... Camden Passage with its antique shops and its renowned res- 
taurants, have not always been viewed as wonderful urban assets* and to 
understand what the official perception of these areas once was we will 
need to journey back in time to those years just after the Second World 
War when Venezuela's first batch of apprentice planners were learning 
their trade a t  the LCC. 
Among the most senior of their mentors was one, Harold P. Clunn, 
whose love of London so far transcended the bounds of municipal duty as 
to lead bun to write a monumental guidebook to the city --The Face of 
London. In it the centre of London is described in minute detail by means 
of a series of "walks" in wbch Mr. Clunn points out all the interesting 
buildings along the way, pausing occasionally to expatiate enthusiastically 
on how a roundabout will be formed a t  this junction here and a modern 
four-lane hghway driven through that decaying area there. 
Today anyone eccentric enough to wander around the city with this 
vast tome clutched to his chest would be astounded to discover that all 
the buildmgs he would like to know about (all the Georgian houses in 
Bloomsbury, for instance) do not rate a mention whilst all those which he 
probably wishes were not there (Adastral House in Theobald's road, for 
instance) are described in excruciating detail. One gets the impression 
*For example, this how Camden Passuge was perceived thirty years q o :  '(Islington High 
Street's) east side is marred by several shabby island blocks of buildings extending from op- 
posite Liverpool Road to Islington Greet. Some day, if a progressive Borough Council can find 
rays and means of purchasing these buildings, they might be pulled down and public gardens 
laid out on this site.' ( C l m  p. 342). 
that Mr. Clunn simply did not see large tracts of the city he wrote about 
or, rather, that he deliberately refused to see them. 
Now, of course, since Mr. Clunn is as entitled to his opinions as is the 
next man, we may be tempted to put all this down to differences of taste 
and, as we are always telling ourselves, there is no accounting for those! 
Quite so; Mr. Clunn's likes and dislikes are as valid as anyone else's but 
this is not what is at issue. Mr. Clunn is not just anyone -- he was, at the 
time he was writing, a highly-placed official in the London County council 
and the trouble is that, in consequence, his likes and dislikes became 
more valid than anyone else's. Today's visitor, no matter how keen he 
may be to see the buildings that Mr. Clunn refused to see, can see only a 
small proportion of those to which Mr. Clunn closed his eyes in the 1940's. 
He cannot see then, try as he may, because they are not there to be seen 
and the question to which we should address ourselves is: 'is there, 
perhaps, some connection between Mr. Clunn refusing to see them then 
and their not being here to be seen now?' 
The answer is an emphatic "yes". Planning, unlike the softer social 
sciences, is based upon immutable natural laws. One, which underpins 
what is called "location theory" and which explains the routes taken by 
urban motorways, is that the best soil conditions are always to be found 
in working class areas. Another, which furnishes the theoretical basis for 
the epidemiology of Planners' Blight, is that if a planner says that an area 
is decayed and it is not, it soon will be. 
Mr. Clunn's view of London is everywhere suffused with the utopian 
planning wisdom of h s  day and one of the charms of his labour-of-love 
guidebook is that it provides us with a rare insight into the sort of 
perception that sustained that wisdom. Unremarkable though that per- 
ception might have been in the 19301s, and through into the 19501s, it 
seems scarcely credible now. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that it 
is the complete reversal -- the negative - of the way we now see our city; 
everything he ignored we now cherish, everything he enthused over we 
now despise ... what was then the brightest jewel in his LCC's crown - the 
White city Estate* -- is now the most notorious "sink estate" of them all. 
It is like flicking through a 1950's copy of Ideal Home and seeing the 
helpful advice that the then arbiters of taste were giving to young mar- 
rieds about to set up home on a shoe-string: Such clever thngs to do with 
Victorian junk -- take this old circular dimrig table, throw the base away, 
fit these three Festival of Britain legs to the top and, presto, a contem- 
porary coffee table. How the children must now wish that their struggling 
parents had put the bases of all those mahogany dining tables away in the 
attic instead of doing as they were told and throwing them on the rubbish 
dump! And then we realize that M r .  Clunn has been throwing away the 
bases, not of a few sticks of furniture, but of our capital city. 
If the perception we now have is the correct one, then the only con- 
clusion we can draw is that planners should either do nothing at  all or 
else they should do the exact opposite of what they think they should do. 
But then (awful thought) is it not possible that the perception we now 
have will, fifty years hence, seem as ludicrously inverted as does Mr. 
Clunn's now? Such conclusions and such doubts, if taken seriously, would 
have a paralysing effect on members of the planning professions. Torn 
*Clunn page 10. 
between wondering whether what they want to do is really what they want 
to do or the exact opposite of what they want to do, and all the time fear- 
ful of doing anything for fear that anything they do is bound to be wrong, 
they would seem to have no option but to settle into permanent and total 
immobility. But there is still one way out of this impasse ... if only we can 
begin to understand the processes by which perceptions are formed and 
transformed. 
It is here that the Venezuelan lesson will prove invaluable, for it turns 
out that the upward slums of Caracas are, to the student of planning, 
what the Michelson-Morley experiment was to Einstein. Tucked away in 
some remote, and all-too-easily rgnored corner, we find some puzzling 
and unpalatable data. Just as Newton's laws of motion broke down when 
some velocities approached the speed of lrght, so the laws of planning 
break down in the barriadm of Latin ~ G r i c a .  In the battle of percep- 
tions the planners, for once and contrary to all the rules, do not come out 
on top. 
The in&vidual squatters, as they build their illegal shacks, do not 
look too far beyond their nose-ends; they know that they have no legal 
title to the land they occupy and that such little control as they are able 
to exercise over their environment derives, not from their inalienable 
rights (for they have none), but from their inertia. Their security of 
tenure is directly proportional to the effort that would have to be made to 
remove them.+ The fact that they have little by way of capital to invest in 
their ramshackle homes causes them little dismay; after all, what would 
*Both their individualism and their insecurity are confirmed by the fact that, in the early 
stages, a member of the family has to be in the house at all times to prevent it being taken 
over by another homeless family. 
be the point of ploughing money into a house that may be flattened by a 
bulldozer tomorrow with no legal redress? But, with each day that 
passes, with each room that is added, with each tin wall that is rebuilt in 
extruded clay block ... with each load of hard-core infill, that inertia 
increases and, as their capital investment mounts little by little, so their 
perceptions of events in time and space also increase. 
The perceptions of these ragged-trousered entrepreneurs may not 
be very wide-ranging but they are impressively realistic; perception and 
contr 01 advance gradually hand-in-hand neither getting too far ahead of 
the other. In consequence, their style of operation is flexible and prag- 
matic -- they do not go in for committing resources irreversibly to the 
pursuit of distant ideological goals for the simple reason that their 
intensely practical perceptions do not leap that far ahead of their ability 
to control their: external world. Operating in this down-to-earth and 
piecemeal way, and mercifully free of any doctrinaire commitment to just 
one kind of progress defined in terms of just one single distant goal, they 
remain resilient and adaptable -- they can react quickly to forestall any 
adverse changes in their situation and to exploit those that afford some 
unexpected opportunity -- and they learn very quickly. As they drag 
themselves up by their own bootstraps their impotence falls away and 
they become shrewd and effective manipulators capable even of arrang- 
ing themselves into straight lines, not because they like straight lines, 
but because they have learnt that this is the way to manipulate the local 
authorities. How very different are these perceptions from those of Mr. 
Clunn. 
Mr. Clunn is on the side of Progress and he has his eyes firmly fixed 
on a very &stant and very glorious New Jerusalem. 
London ... is marching on to a destiny which will make it the grandest 
city in the whole world. It is indeed a victory of civilization, ... The 
new London will be a shning monument to the fortitude and enter- 
prise of its inhabitants. It will be a city of fine wide streets and ave- 
nues with traffic roundabouts, of majestic vistas, beautiful parks, 
squares and riverside gardens, attractive suburbs with all the ameni- 
ties of self-contained towns.* 
This is omelette-making on the heroic scale and Mr. Clunn is going to 
have to crack more than a few eggs in the process. In fact, he lines up 
whole basketsfull ready for the great fry-up and one of these baskets con- 
tains not- less than the entire man-made fabric of the inner city: 
London must be allowed to grow upwards and the straggling villas 
and small houses of Highbury, Barnsbury, Stoke Newington, Hackney, 
Maida Vale and St. John's Wood, must give way to new blocks of 
flats. ++ 
But where, we might ask, is this great omelette - thls shining monument? 
In all this vast urban swathe just one hgh-rise block of flats (appropri- 
ately enough, beside the new traffic roundabout at Highbury Corner) has 
grown upwards and thousands of those small houses and straggling villas 
are still standing. Have these eggs proved too tough to crack or is it that 
they just have not been cracked yet? Well the answer is that they are not 
*Clunn pp. 16-17. 
*Clunn p. 10. 
going to be cracked; the omelette-making has been cancelled. Though 
the planner has declared that the whole inner city area is decayed, yet it 
has not decayed; the second law of planning has broken down, not just in 
Venezuela, but in the centre of London as well. How can this have hap- 
pened? 
Without his realizing it, Mr.  Clunn's perceptions, taking wings unto 
themselves and lured on by that grandiose glittering goal, passed way 
beyond the limits of even his considerable control. Sensing an opportun- 
ity, London's equivalent of the Venezuelan squatters quietly persisted in 
their nonconformity and, stage by gradual stage, transformed acre upon 
acre of supposedly rat-infested slum into glorious heritage. As their con- 
t rd  increased so their perceptions advanced until they reached the real- 
istic point a t  which they could even begin to manipulate the local authori- 
tiea. Of course, it was not roads, sewers, 'piped water and mains electri- 
I 
citf that  they were after -- they already had those; it was des~gnation as a 
Conservation Area, listing as being of architectural and historical 
interest, residents' parking, new iron railings around the parks, and anti- 
dogshit notices on the lamp-posts that they were after. And they got 
than. Just one of those little eggs destined for the Clunn omelette -- just 
one of those straggling villas in St.Johnls Wood tastefully restored and, as 
the estate agents say, extensively refurbished - could now set you back 
250,000. 
What has happened in the inner city is that some of its downward 
slums have changed into upward slums, and the ridiculously obvious con- 
clusion that can be drawn from t h s  is that the fact that such a thng  has 
happened is proof that  it is possible. In the normal course of our day-to- 
day Life such conclusions are so obvious that they do not need to be 
stated; if something happens then, of course, it is possible. When we con- 
sider questions of possibility we usually wrestle with the altogether knot- 
tier problem of whether something that has not happened can happen. 
Only the historian of science and the anthropologist bother themselves 
about the obvious. The historian of science bothers because, time and 
time again, he sees the scientific community going to great lengths to 
ignore the fact that something (like the Michelson-Morley experiment) 
has happened. Invariably the reason is that, according to the then 
current theory about how the world works, it was not possible for such a 
thing to happen. The anthropologist is often priviledged to see this pro- 
cess taken one step further; he sees people act~ng in the world in such a 
way that their actions actually prevent something that otherwise would 
have happened from happening. Both the historian of science and the 
anthropologist could have themselves a field-day in the inner city. 
If the planners' control had not faltered, not one of those straggling 
villas in St. John's Wood would have survived long enough to be refur- 
bished, Alan Bennett's Knockers-Through (and, indeed, Alan Bennett him- 
self) would not have been able to find a single early Victorian terraced 
house to knock through, and a restaurantless Camden Passage would 
have been swept away and replaced by a municipal shrubbery while 
Robert Carrier was still just a PR man for the British Linoleum Corpora- 
tion. None of what has happened would have happened if the planners 
had been able to exercise the degree of control to which they aspired, 
and this leads us to suspect that in the planner's book such transforma- 
tions of downward slums into upward slums are not possible. Our 
suspicions are well-founded; such transformations are not possible 
because, in the planners book, there a r e  only dournward slum. 
The task now is to re-write the planner's book in the light of these 
two discoveries -- one, from Venezuela, that there are upward slums as 
wen as downwards slums; the other, from London's inner suburbs, that 
the latter can sometimes be transformed into the former. 
Planners share the commonsense view that as things are used they 
are used up. On this view, a building when new has a considerable 
economic value and a sizable expected life-span and, as the years go by, 
so that value deceases (in real terms) in line with the decrease in its 
expected useful life. Since a projected life-span of fifty years (typically) 
is one of the design criteria in any local authority brief, and since the lev- 
els of maintenance that subsequently are deemed reasonable are closely 
related to this predetermined span, everything conspires to ensure that 
the building behaves in the way it is expected to behave. After fifty years 
it will, if the archtect has optimized his design, fall down of its own 
accord, and, even if it does not manage to demolish itself, "justifiable" 
maintenance will have decreased to such an extent that it will at least 
have become uninhabitable. 
The inevitablity of such an outcome is enshrined in two graphs -- one 
showing the inexorable decline towards zero value as the building's life 
ebbs away, the other showing that the maintenance needed to ensure the 
"artificial" prolongation of that life increases exponentially. These two 
graphs are to the build environment what Newton's laws of motion were to 
mechanics. Though they tend to be stated in naturalistic terms, they are 
not natural laws; they are articles of faith. They are statements, not of 
how the man-made world is, but of how it ought to be; and the faithful, 
basing their actions on these articles, have until recently proved remark- 
ably successful in getting the reality to conform to the ideal. 
One of the best ways of stopping people from doing something you do 
not want them to do is to insist that it is impossible to do it. A slightly 
weaker form of t h s  same type of dissuasion is the insistence that to do 
such a thng, though perhaps possible, would be unnatural, or unreason- 
able, or simply counter to plain honest-to-goodness commonsense. 'You 
would be banging your head against a brick wall", "it stands to reason" ... 
"use your commonsense", are some of the crash barriers that keep 
unruly human curiosity under social control. "Curiosity", as Granny used 
to say, "killed the cat" and, not wishing to succumb to the same fate, we 
soon learn to use our (by which we mean their) commonsense. Bluff com- 
monsense is often just that -- a huge confidence trick designed to prevent 
us from seeing the full extent of the possible. 
The commonsense ingredient in the planner's two graphs is that 
there is just one trend -- things get worse and they go on and on getting 
worse and worse. What has not been considered, because it flies in the 
face of commonsense , is that things, having got as bad as they can get, 
may begin to get better. A building that ,has reached its allotted span 
may, if it is permitted to linger on, begin to increase in value, and for 
some buildings the level of maintenance needed to stave off deterioration 
may, instead of shooting off to infinity, eventually begin to level out. The 
theory that attempts to handle these bizarre possibilities is called Rubb- 
ish Theory . 
We are all familiar with the way despised Victorian objects have 
become sought-after antiques -- with bakelite Art-deco ashtrays that have 
become collector's items, with old bangers that reappear as vintage 
motor cars -- and the transformation of rat-infested slums into glorious 
heritage is but another example of this widespread and familiar process. 
Yet, though it goes on all the time, we really have no explanation of how it 
happens and, indeed, such theories that we do have often insist that such 
a thing cannot happen. Rubbish Theory attempts to make good this omis- 
sion. 
The basic idea in Rubbish Theory is that, when we take stock of our 
world, we are very selective; we only include those items that are of value 
-- anything that  has no value is excluded. If we did not do this we could 
never complete our stocktaking. Those objects that we include fall into 
two categories: those that increase in value over time (the durable) and 
those that decrease in value over time (the t ransient) .  For some objects, 
such as Queen Anne walnut tallboys and second-hand Ford Cortinas, 
membership is self-evident -- they lie within a region of fixed assump- 
tions. Other objects may not be so unequivocal and, by making a personal 
aesthetic commitment, we may be able to tip them one way or the other. 
Such flexibility is made possible by the existence of a third, unnoticed, 
category -- rubbish.  A transient object, declining in value, can sink into 
*Thompson, Michael. 1070. Rubbish Theory: The Creation and Destruction of Value. Oxford 
University Press. 
rubbish and then a t  some later date be discovered by some creative indi- 
vidual and transferred to durability. Just why some objects get 
transferred and others do not and just why some people are able to do 
this and others are not, are the intriguing questions that Rubbish Theory 
raises and tries to answer. 
The basic hypothesis in Rubbish Theory can be represented by one 
simple little diagram that-describes the ways in whch objects may be 
transferred between these cultural categories. 
Trans l~rs  fhaf h . i p p ~ n  - 
Translerr fllat do no1 I~npprr l  '---- 
Unfortunately, the very simplicity of t h s  diagram tends to obscure the 
significance of what it is saying. 
First of all, it is saying that .objects do not have the qualities they 
have by virtue of their intrinsic physical properties. Their intrinsic physi- 
cal properties are not irrelevant but they do not in themselves determine 
whether an object is assigned to  a particular category. Rather, these 
qualities of transience, durability and rubbishness are conferred upon 
objects as a consequence of those objects being caught up in the process 
of social life. It is saying that the utilitarian or functionalist idea that 
people want things so as to keep body and soul together, whilst often true 
enough, is only a small and rather unimportant part of the story. It may 
explain why people want food but it says nothing about why some people 
want smoked salmon and others salt-cod. To explain this we need the 
idea that, over and above the maiatenance of their physical existence, 
people want things in order to sustain their social existence. There may 
be little to distinguish smoked salmon and salt-cod as far as calorific 
value is concerned but, when it comes to their social meanings, they can 
be poles apart. 
Secondly, the transfer of an object from transience to rubbish and 
from rubbish to durability is subject, not to natural control (though 
natural processes are involved), but to social control. One clear example 
is the inexorable fifty year decline and eventual demolition of a building 
as a result of the control exercised by the planner. In this case, the con- 
trolled transfer is from transience to rubbish, with the possibility of any 
subsequent transfer to durability being removed by the physical removal 
of the building. Another example is the process by which a straggling villa 
that has lingered on is, as a result of having certain not very expensive 
operations carried out on it (at the r~gh t  sort of time and by the right 
sort of person), is transformed into part of our glorious heritage. In this 
case, the controlled transfer is from rubbish to durability and, of course, 
a necessary condition for this to be possible is that the building should 
not be physically removed before it can be culturally transferred. So this 
second mode of control is in direct conflict with the first mode; the first 
mode insists that the building goes, the second that it stays. It is for this 
reason that we are only privileged to see this second kind of transforma- 
tion - the kind that flies in the face of commonsense - at those times and 
in those places where the planner's perception has lost control. 
So the whole process has to do, not with the intrinsic physical condi- 
tion of the built environment, but with something else altogether: the d i f -  
Jsrent w a y s  in w h i c h  tha t  environment is perceived coupled with the ebb 
and  @ o w  of control be tween the holders of those d i f ferent  percept ions .  
Present planning policy is essentially based on the formal elaboration of 
just one of these perceptions coupled with the systematic extension of its 
control. In other words, it is saying "this perception is right and all the 
others are wrong". Rubbish Theory suggests that planning could be some- 
thmg very different. 
If we could say how many different kinds of perception were possible, 
and why it is that an individual should come to hold the perception that 
he holds, and what sorts of changes in that individual's situation are likely 
to result in his rehquishing that particular perception in favour of some 
other, then planning, by conceding the validity of all these different per- 
ceptions and by deliberately compensating for its own bias, could begin to 
concern itself with the appropriateness  of these different perceptions at 
different times and in different places. In doing this planning would, of 
course, become a very different animal. Instead of a ruthless programme 
for the extermination of alien perceptions , it would become a gentle 
modifying framework for their judicious conservation. 
